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Abstract: The agency model used by Apple and other platform providers such as
Google allows upstream rms (content providers like book publishers and developers
of apps) to choose the retail prices of their products (RPM) subject to a xed
revenue-sharing rule. We show that (i) this leads to higher prices if the competitive
pressure is higher downstream than upstream; (ii) upstream rms earn positive
surplus even when platform providers have all the bargaining power; and (iii) with
asymmetric business formats (where only some platform providers use the agency
model), a retail most-favored-nation clause leads to retail prices that resemble the
outcome under industry-wide RPM.
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1 Introduction
The business format that Apple uses for its application providers in App Store
and ebook publishers in iBookstore is called the agency model. In this model,
the upstream rms (content providers like book publishers and developers of apps)
choose the retail prices of their products and the downstream rms (Apple as well
as other platform providers such as Google) specify how the revenue is to be split.
It is a relatively new business format and already it is controversial.1
There are three key ingredients of the agency model and the downstream rms
that use it. First, the rms are typically large and can often dictate contract terms.2
Second, the content providers determine the retail prices of their products. In e¤ect,
the downstream rms cede control over retail prices to the upstream rms, allowing
them to engage in resale price maintenance (RPM). Third, the contract terms specify
revenue-sharing splits (as opposed to wholesale prices in which a downstream rm
announces how much it is willing to pay per unit). It is known, for example, that
Apple applies a 70-30 revenue split, where 70% of the revenue that a service generates
goes to the upstream rm and 30% goes to Apple.
In this paper, we address several questions that arise in relation to the agency
model and the downstream rms that adopt it. First, why would rms that can
dictate their contract terms cede control over anything, particularly something as
fundamental as their retail prices? Second, why would these rms not push the
upstream rms close to indi¤erence, allowing them to earn only enough revenue to
cover their costs? In other words, why give the upstream rms any prot? Third,
what determines when a downstream rm will adopt the agency model versus a more
1On July 10, 2013, a federal judge ruled that Apple was guilty of conspiring with book publishers
to x e-books prices. A key issue was whether Amazon was pressured into using the agency model
(United States v. Apple Inc, 12 Civ. 2826 (DLC)). See also Manne (2013) and Bobelian (2013).
2That Apple can often dictate contract terms to developers of apps is surely true. But it is
also the case that Apple wields considerable bargaining power with book publishers, even the
large ones. This is evident at numerous points in the judges decision (see above footnote). For
example, after noting that HarperCollins, a large book publisher, suggested that Apple take a 20%
commission rather than a 30% commission, she wrote (p. 58) Apple refused to budge. This was
the same commission it charged in the App Store. It would give Apple only a single digit positive
margin and, in Apples view, was necessary to generate the revenue Apple needed to build a great
iBookstore. The 30% commission was ultimately adopted across all of Apples nal Agreements.
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standard business format without RPM. Fourth, to what extent would one expect
there to be a cascade of agency adoption, in which one rm adopting the agency
model is followed closely in time by another rm adopting the agency model, etc.
We examine these issues from a competition-based perspective. In this sense,
the model we use to obtain our insights is similar to the vast majority of vertical-
contracting models in which one side makes the o¤ers and there is competition at
some level in the distribution chain. However, we go a step beyond and assume there
is competition at both the upstream and the downstream levels. Among the stylized
facts we consider are (i) Apple uses the agency model for apps and e-books, but not
for music in its iTunes Store, where it has remained in control of retail prices,3
(ii) other rms such as Google and Amazon have followed Apple in adopting the
agency model, sometimes so quickly that it has led to inquiries into whether they
were pressured into doing so,4 and (iii) the agency model is sometimes bundled with
ancillary contract provisions such as retail most-favored nation clauses (MFNs).5
We obtain our results in three parts. First, we consider a model in which two
upstream rms sell their products to two downstream rms, and each downstream
rm sells both upstream rmsproducts. We compare a setting in which the down-
stream rms decide retail prices with a setting in which the upstream rms decide
retail prices, taking as given the revenue-sharing splits. We nd that retail prices
will be higher in equilibrium under the latter (i.e., RPM) if and only if competitive
pressures are lower upstream (cf. Proposition 3). Thus, to answer our rst moti-
vating question, why would downstream rms ever cede control over something as
fundamental as their retail prices, the reason may be as simple as the downstream
rms want to induce higher prices.6 In particular, we nd that control over retail
3From Steve Jobs biography (Isaacson, 2011) there is a clear indication that he viewed the
agency model in the publishing sector as a second best solution: He [Jobs] had refused to o¤er
the music companies the agency model and allow them to set their own prices. Why? Because he
didnt have to.
4A main point of contention in the recently concluded e-books case was whether Amazons rapid
shift to the agency model was an outcome of explicit collusion among major publishers and Apple.
The major publishers were HarperCollins, Hachette, Macmillan, Penguin and Simon & Schuster.
5MFNs were included in all of Apples agency agreements with the book publishers. The judge
in the case against Apple (see footnote 1) wrote that The MFN guaranteed that the e-books in
Apples e-bookstore would be sold for the lowest retail price available in the marketplace.p. 47.
6One may ask why can a downstream rm that wants to induce higher prices not simply retain
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prices should optimally be given to the level in the distribution chain that faces the
least competitive pressure if the goal is to dampen competition and increase prices.
This nding may o¤er some insights into Apples decision to adopt the agency
model for e-books. At the time of its entry into the e-books market (January 2010),
Apple faced a competitor, Amazon, who was selling e-books for $9.99 (which was
in many cases several dollars below the wholesale price that Amazon was paying).7
Apple was thus faced with a di¢ cult decision. It could either take on Amazon
directly by setting its own low prices, or it could attempt to move the industry
to the agency model in which control of the retail prices was ceded to the book
publishers, where competitive pressures were lower. Apple chose the latter  to
dampen competition. In the words of Steve Jobs (Isaacson, 2011): "We were not
the rst people in the books business,...Given the situation that existed, what was
best for us was to do this akido move and end up with the agency model. And
we pulled it o¤. It was widely recognized at the time that book publishers were
displeased with Amazons low prices in part because they felt it hindered their ability
to sell hardcover books at much higher prices and accompanying prot margins.8
Our nding may also shed light on Apples decision to adopt the agency model
for its application providers when the iPhone was introduced. Because apps are
distributed by large numbers of upstream rms through distribution channels such
as Apples App Store and Googles Google Play, it seems clear that Apple would
have anticipated at the time that ceding control of retail prices to the upstream rms
(and thus away from Apple and its future downstream competitors) would lead to
control of the retail prices and set the higher prices itself? The reason is that it does not compete
in a vacuum. By delegating pricing authority to others that face less competitive pressures (in
this case, the upstream rms), the downstream rm can induce not only higher retail prices on its
own products, but also higher retail prices on its rivalsproducts. In this sense, our analysis ties
into the vertical literature on strategic delegation (see, for example, McGuire and Staelin, 1983;
Coughlan, 1985; Moorthy, 1988; Bonanno and Vickers, 1988; and Coughlan and Wernerfelt, 1989).
7Quoting once again from the e-books case, This meant that the wholesale price for e-books
would equal the wholesale price for physical books, and as a result, the wholesale price that Amazon
paid for an e-book would be set at several dollars above Amazons $9.99 price point.p. 17.
8The Publishers were unhappy with Amazons $9.99 price point and feared that it would have
a number of pernicious e¤ects on their prots ... In the short-term, the Publishers believed the
low-price point was eating into sales of their more protable hardcover books, which were often
priced at thirty dollars or more ...See United States v. Apple Inc, 12 Civ. 2826. (DLC), p. 15.
3
SNF Working Paper No 06/14
low prices.9 Thus, our model suggests that Apple either felt that (i) there were
countervailing factors (which presumably were not present in the e-books market)
that outweighed the benets of dampening competition or that (ii) it would directly
benet from low prices. Boudreau (2012) suggests, for example, that Apple adopted
the agency model for its application developers in order to create entrepreneurship
and innovation by letting a thousand owers bloom". It is also likely that Apple
knew that it would benet from lower prices on apps because of its iPhone sales.
In part two of our paper, we extend the basic model to allow an initial stage of
the game in which the downstream rms choose what revenue-sharing splits to o¤er
the upstream rms. One might think that the downstream rms would be able to
extract the entire surplus in this case. But, despite having no bargaining power,
we nd that the upstream rms always earn strictly positive prot.10 The reason is
that upstream rms can always adjust their retail prices to disadvantage downstream
rms that give them unfavorable terms. If one downstream rm attempted to extract
all the surplus, say by demanding all or nearly all of the revenue from the upstream
rms, the upstream rms would cease selling to it, thereby increasing the sales
of their products at the other downstream rm (because the downstream rms
are substitutes) from whom they earn positive surplus. And if both downstream
rms attempted to extract all or nearly all of the revenue from the upstream rms,
one or both would soon realize that it could do better by backing down from its
demands. Thus, to answer our second motivating question, why would upstream
rms earn positive surplus in equilibrium instead of being squeezed to the point of
indi¤erence, we suggest the reason is that the upstream rms, despite having little
or no bargaining power with downstream rms, still have the ability to shift sales to
rival retailers by increase the price if a downstream rm tries to extract too much.
More generally, we can show that not only will the equilibrium revenue-sharing
splits be less than one, they will also depend on competition at both levels of the
9Google has also adopted an agency model for apps that is identical to the one used by Ap-
ple. Even the revenue split is the same; 30% to Google and 70% to the app developers (http://
support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/112622?hl=en, December 12, 2012).
10Another reason why the downstream rms might allow the upstream rms to earn positive
prot is to induce them to undertake non-contractible investments. We abstract from this by
holding product qualities xed and assuming that any such investments have already been made.
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distribution chain when the upstream rms determine retail prices (cf. Proposition
4). To see why, suppose the downstream rms are symmetric except that one rm
requires a higher revenue share from the upstream rms. Then, the upstream rms
will have an incentive to disadvantage this rm by charging higher retail prices for the
products sold by this rm than for the products sold by the rival downstream rm.
The reason is that this will increase the sales of the downstream rm that o¤ers them
a larger share of the revenue. This e¤ect will put stronger downward pressure on
the downstream rmsrevenue-sharing splits the better substitutes the downstream
rm are in the eyes of consumers. However, the stronger the competition between
the upstream rms, the weaker will be their ability to punish one downstream rm
with higher prices than the other. Higher upstream substitutability therefore tends
to put stronger upward pressure on the downstream rmsrevenue-sharing splits.
In the last part of the paper, we extend our setting to allow the downstream rms
to choose whether to adopt the agency model, possibly leading to an asymmetric
structure in which one rm uses the agency model and the other does not. We ask
whether both rms adopting the agency model can be supported in equilibrium.
This is an important question to ask particularly in light of accusations that Apple
and various book publishers pressured Amazon into adopting the agency model
after it was introduced.11 If industry-wide adoption arises naturally in equilibrium,
then our model would predict that no pressure was needed. But, if industry-wide
adoption does not arise naturally in equilibrium, then our model would predict that
something in addition (e.g., pressureor threats) would indeed have been needed.
We nd that there would be no need to pressure rms into adopting the agency
model when retail prices and industry prots would be higher with the agency
model than without the agency model and competitive pressures upstream are strong
enough. However, pressure would be needed to induce industry-wide adoption of
the agency model when competition upstream is su¢ ciently weak. And, in some
cases, it was found that it may even be possible that no downstream rm would
adopt the agency model in equilibrium even though industry-wide adoption of the
agency model might increase retail prices and industry prots (cf. Proposition 8).
11This was one of the main points of contention in the e-books case. See footnotes 1 and 4.
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Lastly, we consider the stylized fact that when Apple entered the market for
e-books, it used a retail most-favored nation clause (MFN) in its contracts. These
MFN clauses required that the publishers not set higher retail prices at Apple than
the retail prices at other downstream rms, whether or not the lattersprices were
controlled by the book publishers (e.g., the book publishers were not allowed to set
Apples prices higher than Amazons prices even if Amazon could control its own
prices).12
We nd that in this setting, MFNs play an interesting role in that if the rival
rm (e.g., Amazon) does not also adopt the agency model, then the MFN can
lead to uniform prices that resemble the same outcome that would arise under
industry-wide adoption, making Amazons decision a moot point (cf. Proposition 9
and surrounding discussion). This may explain why, when the iPad was launched
(January 2010) and Steve Jobs was asked why someone would buy a book from
Apple for $14.99 if the same book was o¤ered for $9.99 from Amazon, he responded
condently (Isaacson, 2011): "That wont be the case .... The price will be the same".
Thus, to answer our last motivating question, to what extent would one expect
there to be a cascade of adoption of the agency model, we suggest the answer
depends, among other things, on the degree of competitive pressures upstream, and
the use or the non-use of ancillary contract provisions such as retail MFN clauses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview
of the related literature. In Section 3, we present the model. First, we compare an
industry-wide adoption of business formats where revenue-sharing splits are given.
Then we analyze a setting where downstream rms determine their revenue-sharing
splits. Finally, we consider asymmetric market structures in which only one down-
stream rm uses the agency model. In Section 4, we allow the downstream rms to
choose their business format. Finally, in Section 5, we o¤er concluding remarks.
12As noted in the e-books case (footnote 1) While Publishers could theoretically raise e-book
prices in the iBookstore above the $9.99 price point to the top of the Apple pricing tiers, unless the
Publishers moved all of their e-tailers to an agency model and raised e-book prices in all of those
e-bookstores, Apple would be selling its e-books at its competitorslower prices.p. 48
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2 Related Literature
We are aware of four papers that have been inspired by Apples use of the agency
model. They are Gans (2012), Abhiskek et al. (2012) and Johnson (2013a, 2013b).
All have signicant di¤erences from our work. Gans(2012) focus is on the hold-up
problem that may arise if consumers must undertake specic investments in order
to have platform access prior to the upstream rmschoosing prices. Abhishek et
al. (2012) focus on the relationship between printed books and e-books. Johnson
(2013a) is interested in consumer lock-in, and looks at a two-period model of pur-
chases. Like us, Johnson (2013b) analyzes the e¤ects of Apples MFN. He shows that
the MFN eliminates rmsincentives to compete in revenue shares. When revenue
shares are given, the MFN has no e¤ect on retail prices in his model. In contrast,
we show that an MFN can have real e¤ects in an asymmetric business structure,
where only one rm uses the agency model (even if revenue shares are given).
Another key di¤erence concerns the benchmark used for comparisons. Both
Johnson (2013a. 2013b) and Abhishek et al. (2012) compare the outcome under
the agency model in which (i) the downstream rms have all the bargaining power,
(ii) the upstream rms set the retail prices, and (iii) revenues are shared according
to a xed revenue-sharing rule, to the outcome under an alternative model in which
(i) the upstream rms have all the bargaining power, (ii) the downstream rms set
the retail prices, and (iii) unit wholesale prices are used instead of revenue splits. In
contrast, we compare the outcome under the agency model to the outcome under
an alternative model in which the downstream rms set the retail prices, with all
else being equal. This allows us to keep the focus solely on the competitive e¤ects of
transferring the control of retail prices upstream. It also allows us to avoid double
marginalization, which is the main factor that leads to lower retail prices under the
agency model in their frameworks. Here, when conditions are such that the agency
model leads to lower retail prices, it is not because double marginalization is avoided.
Our assumption that contract terms are always set prior to retail prices contrasts
with the assumptions in Dobson and Waterson (2007), who were the rst to consider
the e¤ects of industry-wide RPM. They assume that the timing of the game depends
7
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on which side sets the prices. If retail prices are determined by the downstream
rms (no RPM), they assume that prices are chosen after the wholesale prices are
determined (there is no revenue sharing in their model). However, they assume the
opposite timing with RPM.We discuss briey this alternative timing in Section 3.2.2,
although we note here that although such an extensive form may be appropriate in
some cases, it does not seem to t the cases which have motivated this paper. Apples
70%/30% revenue-sharing rule, for instance, is certainly set prior to retail prices.
Outside of this immediate circle of literature, there exists a broader literature
which focuses on how to nd the minimum number of vertical restraints su¢ cient
to maximize total channel prot. In a recent paper, Hagiu and Wright (2013) ana-
lyze the interplay between who decide retail prices and the incentives to undertake
non-contractible e¤ort like marketing activities. However, they do not focus on the
agency model. Mathewson and Winter (1984) show how a combination of a two-
part tari¤ and RPM may be used to achieve the integrated channel outcome in a
setting in which downstream rms undertake market expanding sales e¤ort with
potential spillovers (see also Iyer, 1998). In addition, revenue-sharing rates which
are set prior to price competition have been shown to be an alternative to lump-sum
xed fees. Lal (1990), for example, shows that revenue-sharing may be used as an
additional instrument to a two-part tari¤ in a context where upstream and down-
stream rms undertake non-contractible sales e¤orts (see also Rao and Srinivasan,
1995). However, our approach is di¤erent, since we aim to analyze what outcomes
may be achieved with the instruments actually incorporated in the agency model.
Like our paper, Cachon and Lariviere (2005), Dana and Spier (2001), and Mortimer
(2008) are motivated by observed contracts.13
Lastly, as we alluded to earlier, one can think of the transfer of pricing control to
the upstream rms as a commitment device to dampen competition. In this sense,
our analysis ties into the vertical-contracting literature that looks at strategic dele-
gation (for example, see McGuire and Staelin, 1983; Coughlan, 1985; Moorthy, 1988;
Bonanno and Vickers, 1988; and Coughlan and Wernerfelt, 1989; among others).
13These papers focus on the revenue-sharing contracts used in the video rental industry, and
show how they may be used to solve channel coordination problems related to inventory choices.
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3 The Model
We consider a market with two competing upstream rms, j = 1; 2 (superscripts
on the variables), and two competing downstream rms, i = 1; 2 (subscripts on the
variables). The upstream rms could for instance be ebook publishers or developers
of apps and the downstream rms could be platform providers such as Apple, Google
and Amazon. For simplicity, we assume that each upstream rm j produces a single
good, good j, which it then distributes to both downstream rms for subsequent
resale to nal consumers.14
We assume the following inverse demand curve for good j at downstream rm i:
P ji = 1 
 
qji + q
j
 i
    q ji + q j i  : (1)
This then gives rise to the following direct-demand system:
qji =
(1  ) (1  )  P ji + P ji + 
 
P j i   P j i

(1  2)  1  2 : (2)
This demand system has been used by Dobson and Waterson (1996, 2007) and
others and found to be tractable in settings like ours with upstream and downstream
competition. Importantly, it allows for independent parameters to capture di¤er-
ences in the intensity of rivalry between downstream rms and between products.
In particular, the parameter  2 [0; 1) captures how similar consumers perceive
goods 1 and 2 to be when sold by the same downstream rm. The goods are demand
independent if  = 0 and perfect substitutes if  ! 1: One can thus think of  as
a measure of the degree of inter-brand rivalry. Similarly, the parameter  2 [0; 1)
captures the substitutability between downstream rms when they sell the same
goods. For brick-and-mortar retailers (e.g. bookstores), the size of  may reect
a geographical dimension. If  = 0, the downstream rms are su¢ ciently far from
each other that they do not compete, while if  ! 1, they are co-located and
perceived as perfect substitutes. In contrast, for digital platforms (selling e.g. e-
books or apps), which do not have a geographic dimension, the size of  may reect
14Our set-up di¤ers from that of most of the vertical-contracting literature, which typically as-
sumes that either (i) an upstream monopolist sells its product through multiple competing retailers
or (ii) multiple competing upstream rms sell their products through exclusive dedicated retailers.
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how di¤erentiated their services are. If consumers perceive the services to be good
substitutes, then  is high. If not, then  is low. One can thus think of  as a
measure of the degree of intra-brand rivalry. The perceived similarity of goods 1
and 2 when sold by di¤erent retailers is thus increasing in the interactive term .
For simplicity, we normalize all production and distribution costs to zero. Thus,
the prot of downstream rm i given revenue share si is given by
Di = si
 
P 1i q
1
i + P
2
i q
2
i

; (3)
and the prot of upstream rm j given revenue shares s1 and s2 is given by
Uj = (1  s1)P j1 qj1 + (1  s2)P j2 qj2: (4)
In these expressions, downstream rm Di keeps share si 2 [0; 1) of the revenue it
earns from selling both products, whereas upstream rm Uj keeps share 1 s1 of the
revenue D1 earns, and 1   s2 of the revenue D2 earns, from selling product j. For
now, the revenue-share splits si are assumed to be exogenous. This assumption is
consistent with Apples one size ts allapproach, in which the same revenue share
is used in di¤erent industries (Apples split is 70/30 for music, apps, and e-books).
In what follows, we compare the outcome where the downstream rms determine
retail prices (no RPM) to the outcome where the upstream rms do so (RPM). In
the case of Apple, we note that it has used the former business format when entering
music distribution with iTunes, whereas it has used the latter format for apps in its
App Store and e-books in its iBookstore. Following convention, we will refer to the
format where the upstream rms determine the retail prices as the agency model.
As a benchmark, it is straightforward to show using the demands in (2) that
industry prots are maximized by setting P ji = PI =
1
2
: The optimal prices from
the industrys point of view are thus independent of how similar consumers perceive
the goods and downstream services to be. However, less diversity does decrease the
size of the market. Inserting the industry-prot maximizing prices into (2) yields
qji = qI =
1
2 (1 + ) (1 + )
and I =
1
(1 + ) (1 + )
:
Here we see that the aggregate quantity (over all rms) and industry prots are
10
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decreasing in both  and . This is a standard property of quadratic utility functions
and holds quite generally when we have convex preferences/heterogenous consumers.
3.1 No RPM
Without RPM, downstream rm i0s optimization problem is
max
P 1i ;P
2
i
Di: (5)
Solving for the Nash equilibrium prices yields
PNO RPM =
1  
2   : (6)
Since si is common to both goods and enters (5) multiplicatively, rm is prot-
maximizing prices are independent of si. It follows that the Nash equilibrium prices
will also be independent of the downstream rmsrevenue shares. This yields:
Lemma 1: Assume no RPM. Retail prices are independent of whether D1 uses a
di¤erent revenue share than D2 (s1 6= s2) or the same revenue share (s1 = s2).
The case of no RPM resembles Apples business format when they entered the
music industry. According to Steve Jobsbiography (Isaacson, 2011), whereas all
upstream rms (providers of music) were o¤ered the same 70/30 split of revenues, it
was Apple alone which decided that the retail price should be 0.99 cents per song.15
An immediate implication of Lemma 1 is that whether Amazon, Google, or
some other downstream platform matches Apple and o¤ers the same 70/30 split of
revenues does not matter for pricing as long as the downstream rms retain control.
To push this result further, note that for there to be an e¤ect on pricing, a
platform would have to o¤er di¤erent revenue splits to the upstream rms (which
is not, to our knowledge, how Apples policy works). To see this, consider the
possibility that downstream rm i requires di¤erent revenue shares from U1 and U2
(in contrast to Apples actual policy, which requires a 70/30 split from all rms).
15Apples retail price for iTunes may have been purposely set lower than normal to stimulate
the sale of its iPods. For simplicity, we have abstracted from the sales of complementary goods.
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Then, we can dene ~Di = s1iP
1
i q
1
i +s
2
iP
2
i q
2
i , and Dis optimization problem becomes
max
P 1i ;P
2
i
~Di:
The corresponding FOCs are given by
d~Di
dP 1i
= s1i

q1i + P
1
i
dq1i
dP 1i

+ s2iP
2
i
dq2i
dP 1i
= 0:
Here, we see that the optimal level of P 1i , and hence the Nash equilibrium prices
in this case, does indeed depend on revenue shares. This yields the following result:
Proposition 1: Assume no RPM. Retail prices are independent of revenue shares
if and only if Di requires the same share si from each upstream rm for i = 1; 2.
This nding contrasts with the case of RPM, to which we now turn.
3.2 RPM: Industry-wide adoption of the agency model
Let us now consider the case of an industry-wide adoption of the agency model. In
this case, the upstream rms determine the retail prices (RPM). Ujs problem is
max
P j1 ;P
j
2
Uj:
This setting accords with Apples agency model towards upstream rms in App
Store and iBookstore. The upstream rms set the retail prices and all are o¤ered the
same revenue share. For now, we assume that rival platforms have similar policies.
In what follows, we focus on pure-strategy equilibria in which both downstream
rms sell both products (qji > 0). The FOC for Uj when it determines D1s retail
price (with a similar expression for determining D2s retail price) is then given by
dUj
dP j1
= (1  s1)
"
qj1 + P
j
1
dqj1
dP j1
#
+ (1  s2)P j2
dqj2
dP j1
= 0: (7)
We see from the second term in (7) that the marginal protability of increasing the
price P j1 is decreasing in s2 if consumers perceive the downstream rms as (imperfect)
substitutes (i.e., if dq
j
2
dP j1
> 0): This means that for a given s1, the optimal level of
12
SNF Working Paper No 06/14
P j1 will be lower the higher is s2: This result follows because if D2 requires a larger
share of its sales revenue; then the upstream rm will have incentives to sell more
through D1 and less through D2. For the same reason, P
j
1 will be increasing in s1.
16
Solving

P j1 ; P
j
2
	
= argmaxUj for j = 1; 2, we nd
Pi =
(1  )  1  2 h1 si+(1 s i)
(1 si)(1+) + (1  )
i
d
; (8)
where d  (2  )2   22   (1 )2(2 s1 s2)2
(1 s1)(1 s2) > 0 whenever the second-order con-
ditions hold and the revenue shares s1; s2 are less than one. We henceforth restrict
the analysis to parameter values for which d > 0. Note that the term in the square
bracket is positive. This implies that Pi is strictly positive if there is imperfect
competition both at the upstream and the downstream levels; i.e. if ;  2 (0; 1):
Since the upstream rms are symmetric, it follows that each will set the same
retail price for Di. We have therefore omitted the superscript on Pi in equation (8).
However, in accordance with FOC (7), we nd that ifDi has a higher (lower) revenue
share si than its rival, then the retail price it faces will also be higher (lower):
Pi   P i = (si   s i) (1  )  (1  ) (2  s1   s2)
d (1  s1) (1  s2) ? 0 if si ? s i:
From equation (8), we can therefore verify the following:
Proposition 2 (the agency model): Assume RPM. Retail prices di¤er if the
downstream rms require di¤erent revenue shares (Pi 6= P i if si 6= s i). Given s i,
an increase in si induces the upstream rms to increase Pi and reduce P i: Other
things equal, these price changes are greater the larger is the substitution between
downstream rms  and the smaller is the substitution between upstream rms :
In contrast to the case of no RPM, we thus see that if one downstream rm has
a higher revenue share than its rival, it will also have higher retail prices as well.
Proposition 2 reects the fact that an upstream rm which increases the retail
price at one downstream rm and reduces it at the other need not lose much in
aggregate sales. The main e¤ect might rather be to shift sales to the downstream
16Note that the bracketed expression in (7) must be negative because dqj2=dP
j
1 > 0 for  > 0.
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rm which has become more competitive. This is more likely to be the case the closer
substitutes the downstream rms are perceived to be in the eyes of the consumers.
For this reason dPi=dsi is more negative (and dP i=dsi more positive) the larger is
: Conversely, if the upstream rms produce goods which the consumers perceive as
close substitutes, then an upstream rm which unilaterally increases its retail price
at one downstream rm may lose a larger share of its sales to its upstream rival.
Now consider the special case in which si = s i (because the rms are symmetric,
one would expect this case to arise if the ss were endogenous) and continue to assume
that both goods are sold by both retailers. Then retail prices under RPM become
PRPM

si=s i
=
1  
2   : (9)
By comparing (6) and (9) we have the following result:
Proposition 3: Retail prices will be higher with RPM than without RPM in any
equilibrium in which both goods are sold and si = s i if and only if the degree of
substitution is lower at the upstream level than it is at the downstream level ( < ).
Since equilibrium retail prices under both formats (RPM and no RPM) are below the
level that would maximize industry prots (PI = 12), it follows that the downstream
rms will uniformly prefer the format that yields higher retail prices other things
equal (i.e., abstracting from (i) cost di¤erences that might arise from implementing
the di¤erent formats, and (ii) consideration of the prots that may be earned from
the sale of complementary products). As a rst approximation, it thus follows that:
Corollary 1: In any equilibrium in which (i) both goods are sold, (ii) si = s i,
and (iii) other things are equal, RPM will tend to increase the prot of each rm if
competitive pressures are lower upstream (  < ). In contrast, RPM will tend to
reduce the prot of each rm if competitive pressures are greater upstream (  > ).
Transferring control of retail pricing to the level where the degree of competition
is lower brings prices closer to the ones that maximize industry prot. Thus, other
things equal, one would expect downstream rms to prefer the agency model when
14
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competitive pressures are lower upstream. If competitive pressures are greater up-
stream, one would not expect downstream rms to prefer the agency model unless
there are countervailing forces in play (e.g., sales of complementary products that
would increase when retail prices are lower) and these forces are su¢ ciently strong.
This yields new insights when comparing the use of the agency model in the
market for apps (App Store) versus its use in the market for e-books (iBookstore).
Although the same format is used in both markets, the reasons why may be di¤erent.
Consider rst the use of the agency model in the market for apps. Apps are
distributed by large numbers of upstream rms through distribution channels such
as Apples App Store and Googles Google Play. It seems clear that, in these markets,
transferring control of retail pricing to the upstream rms (developers of apps) is
likely to increase competition. In the context of our model, this corresponds to a 
that is relatively high compared to  and is consistent with widespread complaints
from app developers in Apples App Store that prots are low (Boudreau, 2012).
Why then does Apple use the agency model and give developers control of the
retail prices? We suspect the reason may be related to factors outside the model
which act as countervailing forces. For example, Boudreau (2012) suggests that
Apple may have ceded control of the retail prices to encourage innovation by letting
a thousand owers bloom.17 It may also be the case that lower prices on apps benet
Apple (and other platforms) in ways that are not considered here (e.g., by increasing
the sale of complementary products, such as the iPhone, which yield an additional
source of prot for the downstream rms). Our model suggests that these factors
must not only weigh in favor of the agency model, they must also be su¢ ciently
strong to overcome the disadvantage of the increased competition we identify here.
Now consider the use of the agency model in the market for e-books. Before
Apple entered the market with iBookstore, downstream rms were responsible for
determining retail prices for both printed and digital books (see Department of
17Foros, Hagen, and Kind (2009) show how a monopoly platform may balance this trade-o¤
by using a price-dependent prot sharing rule implemented by Scandinavian mobile providers in
the market for mobile content messages. The business format used by mobile providers for such
content messages may be considered as the rst-generation app stores.
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Justice (DoJ), 2012).18 After Apples entry in the market for e-books, however,
there was a rapid (and almost) industry-wide transition to the agency model during
the Spring of 2010. DOJs claim is that Apples motivation for instigating this
transition was to stop the low prices set by Amazon on e-books, described as the
$9.99-problemby publishers. It cites Steve Jobs (from Isaacson, 2011): Well go
to [an] agency model, where you set the price, and we get our 30%, and yes, the
customer pays a little more, but thats what you want anyway as evidence of this.
In our set-up, the introduction of the agency model would be expected to lead
to higher retail prices when competitive pressures are lower upstream than they are
downstream. This is likely to be the case in the market for e-books because of the
relatively small number of upstream rms (see DOJ, 2012) and di¤erentiated con-
tent of the books. Moreover, it was widely understood that it was in the interest of
the upstream rms to protect the prots they earn from selling printed books, which
would make upstream competition on e-books even softer than it might be other-
wise.19 Combined with Amazons penchant for setting low ebook prices (perhaps
motivated by its desire to increase sales of its ebook reader Kindle), one might rea-
sonably have conjectured that retail prices would be higher in the agency model.20
This seems to be the reason why Jobs expected prices to rise when it was introduced
(Isaacson, 2011): Amazon screwed it up. It paid the wholesale price for some books,
but started selling them below cost at $9.99. The publishers hated that they thought
it would trash their ability to sell hardcover books at $28. So before Apple even got
on the scene, some booksellers were starting to withhold books from Amazon.
It is therefore not surprising that Apple wanted to use the agency model in the
market for e-books. The motivation behind transferring control of retail prices to
the upstream rms (publishers) was probably not to let a thousand owers bloom
18This is the so-called wholesale model. Unit wholesale prices were specied as a percentage rate
of the cover price but downstream rms were free to set their retail prices below the cover prices.
19We do not explicitly incorporate these additional sources of prot into the model. The e¤ects
of these sources on the rmspricing incentives may, however, be interpreted into  and . For
example, with publishers wanting to protect the prots they earn from their printed books, this
would have the e¤ect of lowering . And, with Apple wanting to stimulate sales of complementary
products like music players, tablets and smartphones, this would have the e¤ect of increasing .
20Amazons motivation for having low retail prices was allegedly to stimulate sales of its ebook
reader, Kindle, similar to what Apple allegedly did with music prices to stimulate its iPode sales.
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(stimulate more innovation among publishers) but rather to dampen competition.21
3.2.1 The agency model: downstream rms decide revenue shares
We now analyze how downstream rms 1 and 2 might set revenue shares when these
are determined prior to the upstream rmsdecisions on retail prices. Notice that
when both downstream rms sell both goods (qji > 0), equilibrium prices in stage 2
are given by (8). It follows that in stage 1, Di chooses si to maximize Di; where
Di = si
 
P ji q
j
i + P
 j
i q
 j
i

:
Upstream symmetry implies that the upstream rms set the same prices at any
downstream rm (P ji = P
 j
i = Pi), so we can write D{s rst-order condition as
dDi
dsi
= 2Piqi + 2si

Pi
dqi
dsi
+ qi
dPi
dsi

= 0: (10)
From (10), we have the following candidate for a symmetric equilibrium:
si = s
   1  21 +  
2   (1 + )

;
ds
d
< 0 and
ds
d
> 0: (11)
The intuition for why s depends on  and  in the way that it does follows from
Proposition 2, which de facto tells us that the opportunity cost to a downstream rm
of increasing its revenue share is higher the greater is the substitution downstream
(the higher is ) and the weaker is the substitution upstream (the smaller is ).
With s1 = s2 = s, the downstream rmsequilibrium prots simplify to
Di =
2 (1  ) (1  )
[2   (1 + )] (2  ) (1 + ) :
It remains to characterize the conditions under which s constitutes a Nash
equilibrium. To this end, it is useful rst to understand why s must be less than
one. Note that if instead a downstream rm attempted to grab 100% of the revenue,
it would be a best response of the rival downstream rm to set s to be slightly less
21Indeed, Apple hoped that Amazon might also be persuaded to transfer control of retail prices
to the upstream rms so that competition could be more fully dampened. To ensure that the
iBookstore would be competitive at higher prices, Apple concluded that it needed to eliminate all
retail price competition. Thus, the nal component of its agency model required the Publishers to
move all of their e-tailers to agency.(United States v. Apple Inc, 12 Civ. 2826 (DLC), p. 40).
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than one. The upstream rms would then choose to sell only to the downstream
rm that gave them positive surplus. This would foreclose the downstream rm
that was setting s = 1, making the rms rival better o¤. It follows therefore that
competition among the downstream rms will ensure that s < 1 in any equilibrium.
More generally, suppose s1 = s: Inserting (11) into (2) and (8) we can write
q1 = 
(1  ) [2  (1 + ) ] s2   (1  )2 (2  )
d [2   (1 + )] (1  s) (1 + ) : (12)
Thus, if D1 sets s1 = s; it will be foreclosed from the market if s2  sf2 ; where
sf2 
(1  )2 (2  )
(1  ) [2   (1 + )] > 0;
dsf
d
< 0 and
dsf
d
> 0:
Intuitively, signds
f
d
= signds

d
< 0 because s1 = s is decreasing in  and a
smaller s1 requires a smaller s2 to foreclose D1 from the market. Analogously,
signds
f
d
= signds

d
> 0: It follows that a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies in
which downstream rms set revenue shares is more likely to exist the more intense
is downstream competition and the weaker is upstream competition.
It remains to check the conditions under which at s1 = s it will not be protable
for D2 to foreclose D1 from the market. Setting s1 = s and s2 = s
f
2 , we nd that
fD2 = 2
(1  )2
[2   (1 + )] (2  ) (1 + ) ;
and therefore foreclosure will not be protable if
Di   fD2 =
2 (1  )
(2   (1 + )) (2  ) (1 + ) (   ) > 0:
Since the numerator and denominator are strictly positive, it follows that fore-
closure will not be protable if  > . Setting  >  into (11) shows that s < 1 in
the relevant area. Remarkably, we thus have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if
and only if the imposition of RPM increases joint prots (see Appendix for proofs):
Proposition 4: Suppose competitive pressures downstream are greater than com-
petitive pressures upstream ( > ). Then, in the modied game in which revenue
shares are endogenous and chosen prior to the rms decisions on retail prices,
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there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which the non-cooperative revenue-share is
s 2 (0; 1): The share is decreasing in  and increasing in ; s0() < 0 and s0() > 0:
This suggests that the result that retail prices and industry prots may be higher
with RPM than without RPM is robust, even when revenue shares are endogenous.
3.2.2 Some more implications
In any equilibrium in which si = s i, we have seen that the equilibrium price under
RPM is given by PRPM = (1  ) = (2  ). This implies that greater substitutabil-
ity (less di¤erentiation) between the upstream goods will unambiguously reduce
equilibrium prices and, since the size of the market will be smaller, also indus-
try prots. However, surprisingly, this does not necessarily mean that downstream
prots will be lower. The reason is that a higher  increases the downstream rms
revenue shares; ds=d > 0: From the downstream rmsperspective we thus have
a trade-o¤ with respect to the degree of di¤erentiation among the upstream rms:
dDi
d
= 2
8<:s[P 0()q + Pq0()]| {z }
 
+ s0()Pq| {z }
+
9=; R 0:
This yields the following result:
Proposition 5: Even though more upstream competition leads to lower equilibrium
retail prices and industry prots in the agency model, downstream prots might nev-
ertheless increase when revenue shares are endogenous and can adjust accordingly.
Proposition 5 points to a novel feature of the analysis. The lower is the degree
of upstream competition (the smaller is ), the higher is the share of revenues that
downstream rms have to o¤er upstream rms. Innovation into more unique con-
tent (leading to a smaller ) at the upstream level might therefore harm downstream
rms, even if it would increase both the size of the market and equilibrium prices.
Timing of the game
It seems reasonable to assume that terms of trade are decided prior to decisions
on retail prices (with and without RPM). Without RPM, we often observe that the
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terms of trade consist of a unit wholesale price. One example is the conventional
business format for books in the US (the wholesale model), where publishers de-
termine a unit wholesale price prior to the bookstoresdecisions on retail prices.
In contrast, in several European book markets, RPM is used. There, the terms of
trade involve revenue sharing instead of unit wholesale prices. Thus, the business
format in European countries where RPM is used resembles the agency model. This
raises the question, why switch from a unit wholesale price to revenue sharing when
control of the retail prices is transferred from downstream rms to upstream rms?
We now show the following:
Proposition 6: Suppose unit wholesale prices are used instead of revenue sharing
in the agency model. Then, even if the downstream rms are in a position to make
take-it-or-leave-it contract o¤ers, all prots will be captured by the upstream rms.
The proof of this is straightforward. For a xed unit wholesale price wi from
downstream rm i, upstream prot maximization is equivalent to maximizing sales.
It follows immediately that each upstream rm j will choose P ji = wi. Setting a
higher retail price than this would cause its own sales to decrease, reducing prots.
Setting a lower retail price than this would violate downstream rm is participation
constraint and cause it to exit the market before any sales are made to consumers.
This result contrasts sharply with the case we have been considering, where the
downstream rms use revenue sharing in stage 1 to earn positive prots unless there
is perfect competition downstream. It follows therefore that from the downstream
rmsperspective, revenue sharing dominates unit wholesale prices under RPM.22
3.3 Only one downstream rm uses the agency model
We now consider asymmetric business formats. Specically, we analyze the case
in which D1 uses RPM (the agency model) but D2 does not. This means that D2
22It is interesting to note that in their seminal work on industry-wide RPM, Dobson and Water-
son (2007) do not allow rms to engage in revenue sharing. They only allow unit wholesale prices.
Presumably to get around the problem we identify, they assume that in the absence of RPM, retail
prices are determined after wholesale prices, whereas with RPM, retail prices are determined (by
the upstream rms) before wholesale prices. Hence, there is a switch in timing with respect to the
terms of trade in their model when control of the retail prices is transferred to the upstream rms.
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decides P 12 and P
2
2 while upstream rm j decides P
j
1 (j = 1; 2):We assume that retail
prices are chosen simultaneously. We also assume that downstream rmsrevenue
shares are the same (s1 = s2 = s): The maximization problems are thus given by
max
P 11
U1 =
2X
i=1
(1  s)P 1i q1i ; max
P 21
U2 =
2X
i=1
(1  s)P 2i q2i ; (13)
and
max
P 12 ;P
2
2
D2 = s
2X
j=1
P j2 q
j
2: (14)
From (13) and (14), we obtain four FOCs. Because the FOCs for U1 and U2 are
symmetric, and the two FOCs for D2 are symmetric, it follows that P 11 = P
2
1 = P1
and P 12 = P
2
2 = P2. Using this, we obtain the following two reaction functions:
23
P1 =
1  
2

1  
2  

+ P2 (15)
and
P2 =
1  
2
+
P1
2
: (16)
Notice that (16) does not depend on the degree of substitution upstream. This
is because D2 cares only about how ercely it competes with its downstream rival
when it chooses its retail prices. If its rival were also setting retail prices, then
P1 = P2 and the solution to (16) would be the same as in the symmetric no RPM
case: P1 = P2 =
1 
2  . In contrast, (15) does depend on the degree of substitution
upstream. In this case, it is the upstream rms who are setting prices at D1. If they
were also setting prices atD2 (i.e., ifD2 were also using RPM), then P1 = P2 and the
solution to (15) would be the same as in the symmetric RPM case: P1 = P2 =
1 
2  .
It follows that because (15) intersects the line P1 = P2 at
1 
2  and (16) intersects
the line P1 = P2 at
1 
2  , the unique intersection of the reaction functions will occur
somewhere between these endpoints. It remains to see, however, whether the RPM
price, given by P1, will be higher or lower than the no RPM price, given by P2.
Combining (15) and (16), and solving for the Nash equilibrium prices, we have
PRPM1 = (1  )
2   + 2 (   ) 
2  2 (2  ) ; (17)
23All SOCs and stability conditions are satised for  < 1 and  < 1: See Appendix.
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and
PNO RPM2 = (1  )
2   + (   ) 
2  2 (2  ) : (18)
The di¤erence in the RPM prices at D1 and the no RPM prices at D2 is thus
PRPM1   PNO RPM2 = (   )
1   
2  2 (2  ) : (19)
Because (19) is positive if and only if  > , it follows that the retail prices of the
rm that uses the agency model will be higher than the retail prices of the rival rm
if and only if competitive pressures are greater downstream than they are upstream.
We illustrate reaction functions (15) and (16) in Figure 1 below. There we x 
at some  = b. The reaction function (15) is given by P2(P1)j=b. If  = b < , the
reaction function (16) is given by P1(P2)j=b<. In this case, retail prices at D1 are
lower than at D2. In contrast, if  = b > , the reaction function (16) is given by
P1(P2)j=b>. In this case, retail prices at D1 are higher than at D2. We can also
see from Figure 1 that the retail prices that arise in equilibrium when only one rm
uses the agency model are bounded by the retail prices that arise in the symmetric
RPM equilibrium (when both rms use the agency model) and the retail prices that
arise in the symmetric no RPM equilibrium (when neither uses the agency model).
We thus have the following result:
Proposition 7: Assume that only D1 uses the agency model (adopts RPM). Then
(i) retail prices at D1 will be higher than retail prices at D2 if and only if  > ;
(ii) retail prices will be lower than they are in a symmetric RPM equilibrium,
and higher than they are in a symmetric no RPM equilibrium, if and only if  > ;
(iii) retail prices will be higher than they are in a symmetric RPM equilibrium,
and lower than they are in a symmetric no RPM equilibrium, if and only if  < .
See the appendix for proofs.
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Figure 1: Reaction functions for U j and D2
To understand why D1 does not always have higher prices, suppose rst that
 = 0: Since we then have no downstream competition, D2 will simply set monopoly
prices; PNO RPM2 ( = 0) = 1=2: Retail prices at D1; on the other hand, will reect
the competitive pressure between the upstream rms, so that PRPM1 ( = 0) =
1 
2 
(i.e., the same price as would result from an industry-wide adoption of RPM). This
means that PNO RPM2 ( = 0) > P
RPM
1 ( = 0): More generally, prices at D1 will
be closely related to upstream competition, and prices at D2 will be closely related
to downstream competition. D2 thus has more incentives to undercut D1s retail
prices the stronger is downstream competition compared to upstream competition,
and for  >  we have PNO RPM2 < P
RPM
1 : Note, however, that both retail prices
are driven to marginal cost if  ! 1. This means that even if retail prices at D1 are
determined by the upstream rms, the Bertrand paradox cannot be avoided if the
downstream rms are undi¤erentiated. A downstream rm which is more expensive
than its rival in this case would lose all its sales, regardless of who has set the prices.
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4 Choice of business format
We have considered the case of (i) no rm using RPM, (ii) both rms using RPM,
and (iii) only one rm using RPM. In this section, we introduce an initial stage of
the game in which the rms non-cooperatively decide whether to use RPM. This
allows us to endogenize these choices. We will continue to assume that s1 = s2 = s:
Consider rst whether both rms using RPM can be supported in equilibrium.
This is an important question in light of the DOJ trial involving Apple and vari-
ous book publishers regarding whether they pressuredAmazon into adopting the
agency model after it was introduced. If industry-wide adoption arises naturally
in equilibrium, then our model would predict that no pressure was needed. But, if
industry-wide adoption does not arise naturally, then our model would predict that
something more (e.g., pressureor threats) would indeed have been needed.
As we will now show, whether both rms using RPM can arise in our game de-
pends on (i) exogenous parameter conditions and (ii) the use or non-use of ancillary
provisions such as retail MFN clauses (which Apple allegedly had in its contracts).
An equilibrium in which both rms use RPM can arise only if it is immune
to protable unilateral deviations. As above, let RPM denote the prot of each
downstream rm if both use RPM, andonly  i RPMi denote the prot of downstream
rm i if only its rival uses RPM. A deviation from RPM is protable for rm i if
dRPMi  only  i RPMi  RPM > 0: Inserting from (9), (17) and (18) into (3) yields
sign dRPMi = sign (   )
 
(   )  
2
 
2  2
(1  ) ( + 1)2
!
; (20)
which implies that a deviation from RPM is protable (dRPMi > 0) if and only if
(i)  >  or (21)
(ii)  >  and  <   max


1     2
(1  ) (1 + )2 ; 0

:
This is surprising. Although one might expect deviations from RPM to be
protable when competitive pressures are greater upstream than downstream, the
second condition suggests that they can be protable for low enough values of 
even when  >  (in particular, we nd that  > 0 for all  2 (0; ) ; where
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   p5  1 =2  0:618). This is surprising because when  is small, the compet-
itive pressure between upstream rms is weak, in which case they should be able to
charge prices which yield high channel prots. However, this is a case of a down-
stream rm deviating so as to capture a larger share of prots for itself; the  < 
inequality reects the fact that if  is small, downstream competition is especially
important, and upstream rms do not take downstream prots into account per se.
Next, we consider whether rm D i would want to deviate if it is the only one
using RPM. This depends on dRPMboth  NO RPM  only  i RPMi ; which simplies to
sign dRPMboth = sign (   )

(   )  2    2
2   2

: (22)
This implies that if Di deviates from RPM then D i will also deviate from RPM if
(i)  >  or (23)
(ii)  >  and  <   2 1  
2  2 :
Since   = 2 2  2+3
(1 )(2 2)(1+)2 > 0; we have that if condition (21) is satised,
then condition (23) will also be satised (i.e., if Di deviates from RPM, then it will
also be in the interest of its rival to do so as well). The constraint  <  is
consequently not binding. Deviation from RPM is protable if and only if  < :
Lastly, we consider when rms might nd it protable to deviate when neither
rm is using RPM. In this case, if rm i deviates and unilaterally adopts the agency
model, its gain in prot will be equal to dNO RPMi  only i RPMi   NO RPM =
 dRPMboth : It follows that its gain will be positive only if  > ; and therefore, it
follows that if  >  and  <  <  then we have an area with multiple equilibria.
Figure 2 sums up the discussion. Above the 45 degree line we have  > ; and
neither rm will use RPM. Below this line channel prots are maximized if both
rms use RPM, but they will fail to do so if  < : For  <  <  we have one
equilibrium where they both choose RPM and one where neither one chooses RPM.
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Figure 2: The choice of business format
Suppose  >  so that retail prices and industry prots are higher with RPM
than without RPM. Then our main results in this section can be stated as follows:
Proposition 8: Assume that  > . Then (i) if  < ; no rm uses RPM; (ii) if
 <  < ; there are multiple equilibria (either both downstream rms use RPM
or neither downstream rm uses RPM), and (iii) if  > ; both rms use RPM.
Returning to the question of whether rms would need to be pressured into
adopting RPM  our results suggest that there would be no need to pressure rms
into adopting RPM when retail prices and industry prots would be higher with
RPM than without RPM and competitive pressures upstream are strong enough
( > ). However, pressurewould be needed to induce industry-wide adoption
of RPM when competition upstream is su¢ ciently weak ( < ). This in turn
suggests that it may indeed be possible that no rm will adopt RPM even though
industry-wide adoption of RPM might increase retail prices and industry prots.
4.1 Retail MFN as an ancillary restraint
We now consider whether a most-favored-nation clause, which was adopted by
Apple in the market for e-books, may help to avoid such a prisoners dilemma. Ac-
cording to the facts in DoJ (2012), Apples contracts with ebook publishers contained
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a Most-Favored-Nation clause(MFN). This clause prevented any publisher from
selling its books at higher retail prices through Apples iBookstore than the books
were sold for elsewhere, independent of whether Apples rivals also used RPM.24
To investigate the e¤ects of an MFN clause in our model, let us hold on to the
assumption that only D1 uses RPM. Then, from equation (19), it follows that D1
will have lower prices than D2 if   , in which case an MFN would not be binding
(see also Figure 1). In contrast, when  > , an MFN clause would be binding.
With a binding MFN clause, D2 would be unable to undercut the prices set
by the upstream rms through D1: Any attempt to do so would only force the
upstream rms to follow suit with their own price cuts. Such a price-reducing
strategy would therefore be protable for D2 only for prices above the cartel price.
However, the cartel price cannot be an equilibrium. This is clear from the analysis
above, which shows that the upstream rms will undercut each other if and only if
P > (1  )=(2  ). It follows that P = (1  )=(2  ) is an equilibrium price.
Not surprisingly, there are a multiplicity of equilibrium prices. This is because
the MFN creates a kink point in the reaction functions of the upstream rms. The
next proposition characterizes the set of equilibria. The proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 9: Assume D1 has an MFN clause and that it is the only retailer
that uses RPM. Then, if  > ; any retail price in the interval [PNO RPM ; PRPM ]
can arise in any equilibrium in which both retailers sell both goods. More formally, if
PMFN denotes the equilibrium retail price under an MFN, then PMFN 2
h
1 
2  ;
1 
2 
i
:
Using equations (17) and (18) it can be seen that an MFN reduces retail prices
at both outlets if PMFN = 1 
2  and increases all retail prices if P
MFN = 1 
2  : Thus,
in principle, an MFN might increase consumer surplus and reduce channel prots or
vice versa. However, even though there exists a continuum of equilibrium prices in
the interval
h
1 
2  ;
1 
2 
i
, the maximum price in this set is arguably the most likely to
24According to DOJ (2012): [T]he MFN here required each publisher to guarantee that it would
lower the retail price of each e-book in Apples iBookstore to match the lowest price o¤ered by
any other retailer, even if the Publisher Defendant did not control that other retailers ultimate
consumer price.A key aspect of the clause, which we emphasize, is that the MFN was expected
to apply even if the ebook publisher did not control the rival retailers ultimate price to consumers.
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arise. This is because any other price an upstream rm may set is weakly dominated
(there is no gain  only potential costs  associated with setting a price below 1 
2  ).
Johnson (2013b) argues that MFNs have no impact on downstream prices under
an industry-wide adoption of the agency model, and thus have no value. However our
analysis suggests that an MFN might increase prices under an asymmetric structure
when  > . Moreover, if rms expect P = 1 
2  when an MFN is imposed, the
possibility that RPM might not be used when  >  (c.f. Proposition 8 ) is avoided.
One would therefore expect the MFN to be a binding constraint. If so, then this
sheds additional light on why Apple may have insisted on having an MFN clause,
given its history of preferring to stay in control of its retail prices. When the iPad
was launched (January 2010), and Steve Jobs was asked why someone should buy a
book from Apple for $14.99 if the same book was o¤ered for $9.99 from Amazon, he
responded (Isaacson, 2011): That wont be the case .... The price will be the same.
5 Conclusion
We set up a model with competition among upstream rms (content providers like
publishers and developers of apps) and downstream rms (platform providers like
Apple, Google and Amazon). In contrast to much of the literature, we assume that
each downstream rm may sell each upstream rms product (e-books, apps, etc.).
We focus on supply contracts that consist of revenue sharing. We rst treat the
revenue shares as exogenous and show that retail prices would be expected to be
higher with the agency model than without the agency model if and only if the
competitive pressure upstream is lower than the competitive pressure downstream.
We next assume that downstream rms (such as Apple, Google and Amazon) are in
position to o¤er revenue shares as take-it-or-leave-it contracts prior to the upstream
rmsdetermination of retail prices. This is consistent with the widespread presump-
tion that Apple, Amazon, and Google have signicant bargaining power over the
upstream rms. We nd that despite the fact that the downstream rms can make
take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers, a key outcome of the model is that the upstream rmspar-
ticipation constraints will in general not be binding. Thus, the upstream rms can
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expect to earn positive prots in our model. We further show that the equilibrium
revenue shares depend on competition at both levels. The greater the competition
at the upstream level, the higher the revenue shares will be. The greater the com-
petition at the downstream level, the lower the revenue shares will be. Lastly, we
show that under asymmetric adoption of business formats (when not all rms use
the agency model), retail MFN clauses may lead to higher equilibrium retail prices.
An interesting implication of how revenue shares are determined is that it creates
an ambiguous relationship between product variety and downstream prots. On the
one hand, we show that greater product variety (less substitution between goods)
implies that retail prices with RPM will be higher. By itself, this is good for the
downstream rms. On the other hand, we show that greater product variety reduces
upstream competition, which may force downstream rms to increase the share of
the revenues they o¤er to upstream rms. This is bad for the downstream rms. Put
di¤erently, we show that greater product variety might increase equilibrium prices
and even the size of the market, but could nonetheless reduce downstream prots.
As a result, product development that has the e¤ect of increasing product variety
and consumerswillingness to pay need not be protable for the downstream rms.
6 Appendix
SOCs and stability conditions, Section 3.3
The second-order conditions for D2 are fullled;
d22D2
d(P 12 )
2 =
d22D2
d(P 22 )
2 =   2s(1 2)(1 2) <
0; d
2D2
d(P 12 )
2
d2D2
d(P 22 )
2  

d2D2
dP 12 dP
2
2
2
= 4s
2
(1 2)2(1 2)
> 0 for ;  < 1; : For the upstream rms
we likewise have d
2Ui
dP 2i1
=   2(1 s)
(1 2)(1 2) < 0 for ;  < 1 and s < 1:
The reaction function for Ui equals P i1 =
(1 )(1 )+P i2+P i1  P i2
2
, so that
we have dP
i
1
dP i2
=  < 1;
dP i1
dP i1
=  < 1 and
 dP i1
dP i2
 =  < 1: For D2 we nd
P i2 =
s(1 )(1 )+sP i1+2sP i2  sP i1
2
; where again all price derivatives are smaller
than one in absolute value. All stability conditions are thus satised.
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Proof of Proposition 7
Proof: (i): follows from (19). (ii) Using (18) and (6) we nd:
P2   PNO RPM = (   )  (1  )
(2  )  2  2 (2  ) > 0 if  > ;
while (17) and (9) give us
PRPM1   PRPM =   (   )
 
2  2 (2  ) < 0 if  > :
(iii) then follows straightforward from (ii).
Proof of Proposition 8
Inserting for (17) and (18) into the prot functions we nd
RPM1D =
2s (1  ) (2   + 2 (   ))  2  2
D1
; 2D =
2s (1  ) (2   + (   ))2
D1
Ui = (1  s) (1  )
 
8 (1  ) (1 + )   2   ( + )2  3 (2  )
D1
;
where D1 = (1 + ) (1 + )
 
2  22 (2  )2 : This implies that
RPM1D   2D =
2s
 
1  2 p9 4+3 2
2(2 ) + 

(1 + )
 
2  22 (2  ) (1 + )2 (   ) (0   ) ;
where 0 =
p
9 4 (3 2)
2(2 ) : We thus have 
RPM
1D   2D for 0 <  < : Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 9
To see that P = (1  )=(2  ) is not a unique equilibrium, suppose that all rms
charge some arbitrary price Q < 1 
2  : The MFN clause prevents the upstream rms
from charging higher prices than D2 does, and as just noted, they have no incentives
to charge a lower price than 1 
2  : The upstream will consequently not deviate from
Q: Neither will D2 have any incentives to price below Q; that would only provoke
correspondingly lower prices at D1; and unambiguously lower prot. So the question
is whether D2 have incentives to deviate upwards from Q: From the analysis of the
NO-RPM equilibrium, we might expect that D2 can protably charge higher prices
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than its rival if and only if Q < 1 
2  : To verify this conjecture, suppose that the
prices at D1 equal P11 = P21 = Q; while D2 charges P12 = P22 = P2; which possibly
is di¤erent from Q: We then nd that
dD2
dP12

Q;P2
= s
(Q    + 1)  2P2 
1  2 (1 + ) :
If there were no constraints, D2 would thus charge P2 = (Q    + 1) =2: Using
this, we nd
P2  Q = 2  
2

1  
2    Q

:
Since the MFN constraint implies that we must have P2  Q; it follows that D2 can
protably deviate from Q (and charge a higher price) if and only if Q < 1 
2  :
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Turning the Page on Business  
Formats for Digital Platforms:  
Does Apple’s Agency Model 
Soften Competition?
Øystein Foros
Hans Jarle Kind
Greg Shaffer
The agency model used by Apple and other platform providers such as Google 
allows upstream firms (content providers like book publishers and developers 
of apps) to choose the retail prices of their products (RPM) subject to a fixed 
revenue-sharing rule. We show that (i) this leads to higher prices if the com-
petitive pressure is higher downstream than upstream; (ii) upstream firms 
earn positive surplus even when platform providers have all the bargaining 
power; and (iii) with asymmetric business formats (where only some platform 
providers use the agency model), a retail most-favored-nation clause leads to 
retail prices that resemble the outcome under industry-wide RPM.
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